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Executive summary 
In this thesis I argue that while the financial sector has undergone major growth in the 
last 50 years, that at least recently this growth has been built on an increasing 
assumption of risk. In order to prove my argument I examined the problems associated 
with FISIM, ROE and the increase of tail-end risk assumption in the U.S. commercial 
banking sector. I first examined the problems associated with measuring implicitly 
charged services through FISIM. I found that adjusting loan-side FISIM to reflect risk 
led to a reduction, and that the choice of reference rate largely affects the outcome of 
the calculation of FISIM. Correspondingly, the lack of definition by regulators as to a 
proper reference rate, FISIM thus does not reflect a clear picture of finance in the 
economy. I next show that by breaking down the ROE of the U.S. commercial banking 
sector it can be seen that financial leverage may be responsible for the historically high 
RO; however further research is needed to confirm this assumption. I also examined the 
increase in both tail-end risk exposures as represented by derivatives, and the increase 
in competition among banks, two factors which have been shown to contribute to 
financial fragility, and thus may have contributed to the sub-prime crisis. Finally, I 
found that it might be possible to use a risk-reflected FISIM as a warning signal to show 
when banks are engaging in risky behavior, by not estimating the proper risk premium 
to cover risks.  The implications of this last finding, while preliminary in nature still 
requiring much work to uncover its plausibility, but if verified could prove to be a tool 
for monitoring banks risk pricing abilities. 
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Chapter One 
Introduction and Background 
 
1.1 Introduction 
The financial sector of the United States has been demonized in the last few years, in 
relation to the Sub-prime crisis and the global economic downturn. Many claim this 
crisis will rearrange the financial landscape of the world and we will see dramatic 
changes such as the revival of U.S. household savings and the end of risk modeling, as 
well some not so surprising side effects, such as an explosion of public debt and 
accelerating financial concentration (Kaufmann, 2009, p.221). While in general the 
underlying causes of financial crises may go back to the fundamentals of the capitalist 
system1, many have laid the blame for the recent sub-prime crisis squarely on financial 
deregulation, financial innovations, excessive risk-taking and lending practices of 
financial intermediaries, as well as Greenspan and his lax monetary policy (Munchau 
2010, pp. 7-44). By nature, the services provided by financial intermediation are based 
on assuming some degree of risk in order to make a profit, but there is a fine and not 
always identifiable line between appropriate risk and excessive risk. Of course ex-post, 
we can see that the financial intermediaries in the U.S may have engaged in excessive 
risk taking; we can be confident in saying this because after all there was a crisis. 
However, how can we judge the appropriate level of risk taking ex-ante or before the 
system is so taxed that is starts to unravel? In other words how can we distinguish 
positive growth in the financial sector and growth build on increasing levels of risk, in 
search of higher returns?   
                                                        
1 Here I am referring to the financial fragility theories of Fisher, Minsky and 
Kindleberger. 
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 This is an important and fundamental question to which there is no easy answer. 
However, this question needs to be answered if we are to reduce the frequency and 
damaging impacts of financial crises, and a better understanding of the measurements 
and performance ratios used to judge the state of the financial sector is a good place to 
start. Some questions which need to be examined are, first, what measurements are used 
to judge the output of the financial sector, and second, are these measurements giving us 
the whole story, or are they just obscure enough, intentionally or unintentionally, to give 
a false sense of security in the role of finance in the greater economy. It is in this 
direction that I have focused my research and I hope to give some light on these 
contemporary and important issues.  
 
1.2 Background 
The financial sector has rapidly grown in recent years, outpacing the larger economy as 
well as regulation. Although this is an international phenomenon, it is especially true for 
the U.S. and UK, both major financial centers, which saw rapid growth in the last few 
decades. In the U.S., the financial sector grew tremendously, from 2.32% of GDP (gross 
domestic product) in 1947, to 7.69% in 2005, and employee compensation in the 
financial sector grew concomitantly, from 2.76% to 7.65% for the same time period 
(Philippon 2007, p. 2). The story is the same in UK where GVA (gross value added) of 
the financial intermediation sector has grown faster than the economy as a whole by 
more than 2 percent per year, or more than double that of the economy as a whole 
(Haldane, Brennan and Madouros 2010, p. 4). 
While there is much debate, there is no consensus as to the causes of this 
growth. Some have argued that the evolution and rise of corporate finance has spurred 
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the growth (Philippon 2007, pp. 3-4). Others argue that we have been witnesses to a 
financial revolution, claiming IT, financial innovations, and globalizations have spurred 
the growth (Gieve 2007, p.2). Still others have argued that the growth of the financial 
sector was merely an illusion or high returns built of greater assumption of risk 
(Haldane, Brennan and Madouros 2010). Despite the lack of consensus in the debate on 
the cause of growth, most agree that financial sector has undergone rapid growth and 
thus has become increasing important to the greater economy. 
In the buildup to the sub-prime crisis, the perceived importance of the financial 
sector has seen a comparable growth. A Mckinsey report issued in 2007, just before the 
financial meltdown, signed by both U.S. Senator Charles Schumer and New York City 
Mayor Michael Bloomberg, sings the praises of the financial sector calling it vital to the 
heart of the economy. The report describes the financial sector as a large, fast growing 
industry, a major contributor to the tax base and a major source of quality jobs, 
accounting for 1 in every 19 jobs nationally. According to the report, financial services 
is the third largest sector of the U.S. economy, accounting for approximately 8% of GDP, 
and from 1995 to 2005 the industry grew at a compound annual growth rate of more 
than 5%. The report further emphasize the indirect input, or positive externalities of the 
financial sector, saying that well-regulated and efficient financial markets fuel growth 
by optimizing capital allocation, allow market participants to raise capital at lower costs, 
as well as enhance financial stability through better risk management and diversification, 
which lowers overall systemic risks (Mckinsey report 2007, pp.34-36). While some of 
the statements in this report, regarding enhanced financial stability and risk 
management of the financial sector, can be seen retrospectively as exaggerated or 
misguided, the report exemplifies the general pre-crisis view of the importance of the 
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financial sector to the economy. 
 However, as the sub-prime crisis took root, public opinion quickly turned a full 
360 degrees and many started to question the role of financial sector growth in the crisis.  
This opinion can be seen in the popular media as well as in academia and professional 
circles. Michael Moore’s movie Capitalism, captured, or may have formed, the public 
opinion about the evils of risk taking financial intermediaries, who were profiting 
tremendously at the expense of the working classes. While this movie has many flaws, 
grossly under researched and focuses rather one-sidedly on the bad side of finance, it 
had the effect of rallying Americans to demand some accountability in the financial 
sector. 
 Academia also has it views on financial sector growth. If financial fragility 
theorists are correct, then the booms and busts of the business cycle are just an inherent 
part of the capitalist system (Minsky 1977). By this argument, we can expect to see 
crisis after crisis due to the fragile nature of capitalist economies. However, even if we 
expect the next crisis, we may not be able to prevent it because no two crisis happen in 
exactly the same way; the nature, timing and fallout of each different.  The sub-prime 
crisis is no exception to this rule. While the crisis itself was not so difficult to predict, 
because housing prices could not increase perpetually, the aftermath and its reach were 
harder to predict. The linkages between homeowner default and the destruction of the 
value of new exotic asset-backed instruments, as well as the inter-banking lending 
freeze, were not understood by many and thus hard to foresee (Ferguson 2008, p. 336).  
With the collapse of the housing bubble the spread of the crisis across 
international markets, the implication of excessive growth in the financial sector and its 
real value started to be seriously questioned. Has this growth in the financial sector been 
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accompanied by a growth in the benefit to society, or has it only benefited those 
working in the top ranks of the sector? To put it another way, is the financial sector 
benefiting the economy and society, or is it benefiting from the economy and society? 
This is another important question to which there is no easy answer.  
Any conversation relating to growth in the financial sector is not complete with 
discussing the role of regulation. Central to this is the question of how the financial 
sector was able to build upon so risky a base, despite heavy regulation including the 
implementation of the Basel II capital adequacy restrictions, without tipping off 
regulators or officials. While investment banks fall outside the framework of the Basel 
II, commercial banking is covered by it and followed it precisely. However despite 
following the strict 8% capital adequacy standard, many commercial banks were also 
increasing their off-sheet balance assets, some of which carry large tail-end risks, 
increasing their returns without exceeding the capital adequacy requirements.  
 
1.2.1 Measuring output of the financial sector 
Fundamental to understanding the growth in the finance sector is a solid understanding 
of how growth is measured. How can regulators be expected to manage the economy if 
the measurements are not giving them the whole picture, or even giving misleading 
information? If the measurements are not representing the full picture, than there are no 
preventative measures to reign in unhealthy growth in finance, and no forewarning of an 
impending crisis. This brings us to the discussion of how the contribution of finance is 
measured. 
The standard method of measuring the output of a sector, and thus its 
contribution to the economy is GVA, which the UN (United Nations) SNA (System of 
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National Accounts) defines as, the value of output less the value of intermediate 
consumption (Value of output – value of intermediate consumption).2 Through this 
basic measurement, the contribution of a sector of the economy to GDP can be seen. 
However, there are problems in applying this method to all sectors. In particular, for the 
financial sector, GVA does not represent its entire contribution to the economy. The 
argument has been developed that GVA is not the best way to estimate the contribution 
of the financial sector because it only measures the direct contribution to the economy 
and ignores indirect contributions, or implicit services, such as productivity growth 
through provisions of funds for start up businesses and new investment projects, which 
may be important contributors (Haldane, Brennan, Madouros 2010 p.3). To address the 
value added by the indirect contributions and implicit services provided by financial 
intermediaries, the SNA introduced FISIM (Financial Intermediation Services Indirectly 
Measured) in 1992, as a rough guideline, which when used in connection with GVA, in 
theory, better approximates the value of the output of the financial sector, and thus its 
contribution to GDP. 
This new standard for measuring the output of the financial sector, using a 
combination of GVA and FISIM, in theory captures the value of both the explicit and 
implicit services provided by financial intermediation. GVA still measures explicit 
output, such as financial consulting, portfolio management, loan processing fees, etc, 
while FISIM measures implicit services, such as offering depositors a better rate than 
hording their cash at home, and providing funds to borrowers. Financial intermediaries 
provide a variety of services to depositors, borrowers and clients, and not all of these are 
explicitly charged for, but are embedded in the interest rate banks charge to borrowers 
                                                        
2 UN System of National Accounts 1993 
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and paid to depositors.3 For example, if a bank provides consulting services for an 
individual, they can charge a set fee for the services provided, and the banks profit is 
clear. But if that same individual also has deposits in the bank, or a loan from the bank, 
the bank is offering a different basket of services all together, implicit services, which 
are not directly charged. Finally by adding the output of both the implicit and explicit 
services rendered by the financial sector, as measured with the combination of GVA and 
FISIM, we can get the total value of the output of the financial sector to the economy. 
 
1.2.2 Problems with the standard calculation of FISIM 
While calculating GVA is straight forward, the calculation of FISIM is not as clear. As 
previously discussed, measuring the total value of the output of the financial sector is 
difficult because some of this output is not explicitly charged for, but imbedded in the 
interest spread charged to borrowers and paid to depositors. To see how FISIM captures 
this implicit value, I will briefly explain methods used to calculate it and some problems 
that arise in the calculations. 
 The simple definition of FISIM is provided by the SNA as, “The difference 
between the rate paid to banks by borrowers and a reference rate, plus the difference 
between the same reference rate and the rate actually paid to depositors”.4 Basically, 
FISIM measures the services provided by financial intermediaries in taking deposits and 
making loans.  
 The SNA defines four ways in which financial services are provided and 
charged for:5 
                                                        
3 These issues are discussed in detail in Haldane, Brennan and Madouros (2010). 
4 SNA Book section 6.163, page, 115. 
5 SNA Book section 6.160, page, 115. 
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1. Financial services provided in return for explicit charges 
2. Financial services provided in association with interest charges on loans and 
deposits 
3. Financial services associated with the acquisition and deposal of financial assets 
and liabilities in financial markets 
4. Financial services associated with insurance and pension schemes 
The first group, services provided in return for explicit charges, includes many of the 
services provided by financial institutions, including but not limited to, portfolio 
management, arranging mortgages, giving tax advice, and processing credit card 
payments for businesses. For these types of services, the service itself and the charges 
associated with the service are easily defined and computed. The second group, services 
provided in association with interest charges on loans and deposits, needs further 
explanation because these services are not so easy to identify. This group contains the 
services provided by traditional financial intermediation, which the SNA defines as the 
process by which a financial institution accepts deposits from a party wishing to receive 
interest on funds for which they have no immediate use for, and they then lend these 
funds to another party whose funds are insufficient to meet their immediate needs. In 
this function the financial institution supplies a link by which the first party can lend to 
the second and each of parties pay a fee to the financial institution for the service 
provided. The party, which lends the funds, accepts a rate of interest lower than the rate 
paid to the borrower, and the difference between these rates composes the combined 
fees implicitly charged by the financial institution to the depositor and borrower.6 
Problems in calculating FISIM can arise in the selection of reference rate, as 
                                                        
6 This paragraph is paraphrased from the SNA book section 6.163, page 115. 
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well as which loans and deposits to include in the calculation. In regard to the reference 
rate, the SNA specifies that the rate should be between the bank interest rates on 
Deposits and loans.  Furthermore, because loans and deposits held in a bank are not 
necessarily equal, the reference rate cannot be a calculated as a simple average, but 
should be a rate which “contains no service charge and reflects the risks and maturity of 
the deposits and loans”.7 However, banks have many different categories of loans and 
deposits, all with different interest rates paid and received. Therefore the selection of a 
single reference rate to capture the total implicit output of a bank is bound to lead to 
misrepresentations (Eichmann 2010, Fixler and Zieschang 2010, Basu, Inklaar and 
Wang 2008, Colangelo and Mink 2010, Davies 2010). The SNA does not explicitly 
provide a reference rate in their guideline, but does suggest an inter-bank lending rate 
may be appropriate. On this point, regarding the choice of reference rate, there currently 
is much debate, which I will discuss at length in the literature review in chapter 2. 
 
1.2.3 Adjusting FISIM to reflected risk 
In addition to the selection of a reference rate, FISIM has other conceptual problems, 
including its inclusion of risk. Research in this area has grown in the last few years as 
the sub-prime crisis has brought to light some of the deficiencies of FISIM in measuring 
implicit output. Generally, these risk-adjusted FISIM theories center on the issue of how 
to extract the risks that are imbedded in the SNA method of calculating FISIM. These 
risks include mainly term premium and default risk on the loan-side of FISIM. 
 To explain how these risks affect FISIM, we have to look in more detail at its 
calculation. The SNA equation is as follows: 
                                                        
7 SNA Book, section 6.166, page, 116. 
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Total implicit output = output of depositor’s services + output of borrower’s services  
Output of depositor’s services = (reference rate - average rate paid) x average liability balance 
Output of borrower’s services = (average rate received – reference rate) x average asset balance 
Average rate paid = (interest expense / average liability balance) 
Average rate received = (interest income / average asset balance) 
 Focusing on the loan side, both the term premium and default risks are 
supposed to be captured by subtracting the reference rate from the average rate received 
for the balance of loans held by a bank.  However, by following the SNA guideline of 
using a reference rate which reflects a risk-free rate of borrowing, for example a U.S. 
Treasury bill as is used in the U.S., it’s hard to see how this can properly reflect the risk 
premium. While the calculation of an average interest rate received will include to some 
degree the losses the bank has suffered in the past, it has no connection to present or 
future trends, thus further examination of the reference rate used in calculating the 
loan-side FISIM is warranted.  
 To summarize, the calculation of FISIM is fraught with problems, assumptions 
and ambiguities. The method for calculating FISIM as conceived of by the SNA, is 
more of a guideline, and not set in stone. The specific numbers used in the calculation 
are left to the individual country or institution. While its not my intention to criticize the 
SNA for their lack of definition in calculating FISIM; this is understandable given the 
problems associated with applying one method of measurement to many different 
countries, with their own unique economies. However, this same ambiguity surrounding 
the calculation of FISIM also in a way negates the very reasons for its creation. In other 
words, FISIM is supposed to enhance the measurement of the output of the financial 
sector by providing more information on the value of implicit services. However, with 
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the vagueness of calculation standards and the inherent conceptual problems in defining 
something as slippery as “the value of implicit services”, it is hard to see how FISIM 
can provide any useful and accurate information on the output of the financial sector.  
 
This is the first main topic of my thesis, the problems associated with FISIM. 
 
1.2.4 Balance sheet manipulation 
The sub-prime crisis has brought out many questions surrounding the reportedly high 
returns in financial sector even while the system was breaking down.  While 
measuring financial sector output through FISIM and GVA has its problems, so too does 
the way we judge its performance as represented by financial statements and 
performance ratios. These performance ratios such as ROE (Return on Equity), ROA 
(Return on Assets), and others give a picture of how the firm, or bank is profiting, 
however, these ratios are easily manipulated by increasing some kinds of risks and thus 
can cloud or misrepresent a firm or bank’s risk position and profitability. 
Banks have many tools with which to manipulate their balance sheets. ROE 
can be artificially boosted simply by increasing leverage, or the amount of total assets to 
Tier 1 capital, which in effect makes the bank look more profitable, but the risks of 
insolvency can increase when riskier assets are included in the pool of total assets. This 
ties in with the kinds of assets banks have on and off their balance sheets. Increasing the 
percentage of assets which carry large tail-end risks is another method by which banks 
artificially boost performance. This technique involves stockpiling assets or financial 
products into the asset pool, which have above average returns, in exchange for 
assuming greater risks. This is fine if the risks do not materialize, but if the small chance 
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of risk comes to be reality then the banks will also loose above average losses. While 
these techniques increase ROE, some argue the increase is an illusion and can 
negatively affect systemic risk and the FISIM output (Haldane, Brennan and Madouros 
2010, Ashcraft and Steindel 2008). 
In the years leading up to the sub-prime crisis, the US commercial banking 
sector was reporting its highest ROE on record, hovering around 14% for the decade 
from 1994 to 2004, as shown in figure 1 below. As is now known, despite this 
record-high ROE, the financial system was is such a fragile state that when Lehman 
Brothers failed in 2008, the whole system started to unravel. Financial intermediaries, 
including commercial banks, manipulated their balance sheets chasing higher returns 
and an elevated ROE. 
 
Figure 1 Return on Equity of U.S. commercial banks, 1934 to 2010 
Source: FDIC and author’s calculations 
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slow but steady increase in ROE from around 1935 until the early 1980’s when the 
saving and loan crisis broke out, and many institutions failed. Then in the mid-1990’s 
the ROE jumps to record heights, reaching around 15 percent in 1999. 
Many researchers have tried to explain the source of these high ROE’s in 
commercial banks. One argument is that the banking sector benefited from the Solow 
residual which refers to productivity gains achieved from increases in technology, in 
this case the IT revolution, which translated to an increase in output and ROE (Haldane, 
Brennan, and Madouros 2010, pp.10-12, Gieve 2010, pp.2-3). Another argument is that 
this increase in ROE was merely window-dressing, or balance sheet manipulation, in 
the form of increased financial leverage (Haldane, Brennan and Madouros 2010, 
pp.13-18, Ashcraft and Steindel 2008, pp.3). Still another argument is the claim that the 
increased ROE is a result of seeking higher returns through tail-end risky products and 
assets, included off-balance sheet financing techniques and increased bank involvement 
in the growing derivatives market (Haldane, Brennan, Madouros 2010).  These issues 
will be further elaborated upon in the literature review. 
 
This is the second main topic of my thesis, the factors affecting ROE for the U.S. 
commercial banking sector. 
 
1.2.5 Tail-end risk, financial innovations and financial fragility 
In the wake of the sub-prime crisis, questions have repeatedly been asked about the 
risks taken on by the financial sector, in particular investment banks. While the risks 
undertaken in relation to securitized sub-prime loans on the part of major investment 
banks such as Lehman Brothers, Goldman Sachs and others is well known, commercial 
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banks were also involved although to a lesser degree, in off-balance sheet financing, and 
some other structured financial products. In this sense, commercial banks started to 
resemble investment banks, or at least the lines separating the two kinds of institution 
were beginning to blur (Davis, 2009, p.36).  
Despite the heavy regulation of U.S. markets and banks, including Basel 
accords, FDIC, FRB (Federal Reserve Board), and SEC (Securities and Exchange 
Commission) just to name a few of the regulatory agencies, commercial banks still 
found ways to increase their risk profile in search of returns. To this point Gorton argues 
that the sub-prime crisis has its roots in the transformation of the banking system 
centering around two changes, first the exponential growth in derivative securities, and 
the massive amounts of loans originated by banks into capital markets through 
securitization (Gorton 2010, p. 16). The U.S. commercial banking sector in particular 
has experienced a dramatic increase in the derivatives reported by the banks, as show in 
figure 2 below. 
 
Figure 2 Derivatives and total assets reported by U.S. commercial banks, 1992 to 2010 
Source: FDIC 
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This growth in derivatives reported by banking sector, has far outpaced the 
total assets reported on their balance sheets. In this sense, the difference between 
investment banks and commercial banks is reduced except for the fact that commercial 
banks are FDIC insured, meaning there depositors are guaranteed. The moral hazard 
implications are obvious, and this raises a question as to whether this gives commercial 
banks more freedom to chase tail-end risk, or does heavy regulations and capital 
adequacy keep these institutions is check?  However, this last point is still 
controversial and beyond the scope of my research. 
 Increasing the amount of securitized loans and derivatives held by a bank has 
the effect of increasing the risk exposure, or at least moving the risk exposure to the 
tail-end of the risk spectrum. This makes a bank more susceptible to failure if something 
goes awry in the greater economy, and if enough banks are involved in this increase in 
risk exposure, the systemic fragility increases. According to the laws of normal 
distribution, the risks become greater the farther you stray from the mean. This implies 
that in general a risk-adverse individual will place a bet close to the middle of the 
spectrum, where returns are low-but-stable. Conversely the risk-seeking individual will 
place their bet away from the center, closer to the tail, where returns are higher, but the 
return is less certain.  
The financial sector was placing their bets way at the tail-end of the risk 
spectrum en masse leading up to the sub-prime crisis. Banks were placing their bets on 
one of the many possible future states of the world being realized, that prices would 
keep going up. If this is realized, they earn above average returns in exchange for 
assuming greater risk. However, if one of the ugly states of the world is realized, say 
one in which a major institution like Lehman Brothers is allowed to fail by the 
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government, and homeowners default in mass, the banks may lose big. This is just what 
happened and presents the dangers of seeking phantom returns through balance sheet 
manipulation. 
The implications of this increase in risk are that the system becomes more 
fragile and closer to crisis. When a bank deepens its risk exposure they become more 
vulnerable to insolvency if systemic shocks and adverse events in the greater economy 
occur. But an approximate level of risk, or borrower credit worthiness, can be difficult 
to judge in a state of “irrational exuberance”8 where asset values are expected to keep 
rising, as was the case in the sub-prime crisis. As Lowenstein writes, before the crisis 
there was a general feeling that risk was outmoded, or no longer a threat (Lowenstein, 
2010, p.296). Banks were taking larger risks, and the system was weakening.  
As the sub-prime crisis unfolded, the number of bank failures saw a sharp 
increase. As shown in figure 3, the number of failed commercial banks first peaked in 
the late 1930’s, and then remained relatively stable.  In the 1980’s the savings & loan 
crisis saw massive system-wide failure of banks, peaking at 534 in 1989. Then from 
1997 to 2007 there was on average, 4 bank failures per year, but as the sub-prime crisis 
unfolded, again many banks begin to find themselves insolvent, and the number 
increases to 30 in 2008 and then skyrockets to 148 in 2009, and 154 in 2010.9 
  
                                                        
8 Alan Greenspan Speech given at the Annual Dinner and Francis Boyer Lecture of The 
American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, Washington, D.C. 
December 5, 1996. Available at 
congresshttp://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/speeches/1996/19961205.htm 
9 Source FDIC 
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Figure 3 Number of failed U.S. commercial banks, 1930 to 2010 
Source: FDIC 
  
 In the build-up to the sub-prime crisis there was an increase in the use of and 
involvement in new exotic products and derivatives among commercial banks. It has 
been argued that the nature of these financial innovations is extremely complicated and 
dangerous to investors and the economy as a whole, and yet, many professionals 
invested heavily in them without fully understanding them (Mauchau 2010, p. 43).  
What is the impact of poorly understood and widely used financial innovations, in 
increasing tail-end risk and financial fragility? 
 
This is the third main topic of my thesis, the impact of the increase in tail-end risk of the 
U.S. commercial banking sector, as represented by derivatives. 
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In the literature review I will expand the discussion on some of the previously discussed 
issues and present many theories of how to adjust FISIM to address these deficiencies.  
I will also expand the issues surrounding performance measures and tail-end risk in the 
U.S. commercial banking sector.  I will then apply four different methods by which the 
standard FISIM can be adjusted to reflect risk to approximate a risk-reflected 
measurement of the loan-side FISIM of the U.S. commercial banking sector.  This, I 
hope will bring some of the problems associated with FISIM to light with a practical 
example, from which conclusions and recommendations can be made. 
 
1.3 Research objectives and questions 
The objectives of my research are: 
1) To gain a deeper understanding of how FISIM functions to measure implicit services 
of the financial sector, and secondly to show how risk affects the calculation of 
FISIM with the case of the U.S. commercial banking sector. I hope to add to this 
body of research with my analysis of the loan-side FISIM of the U.S. commercial 
banking sector. 
2) To examine the ROE of the U.S. commercial banking sector leading up to the 
sub-prime crisis, to discover what factors were responsible for the increasingly high 
ROE. 
3) To look at the increase of tail-end risk in the U.S. commercial banking sector, and 
analyze its impact of financial fragility. 
 
My research questions are as follows: 
1) Are the implicit services provided by the commercial banking sector properly 
  
27 
reflected by the standard calculation of FISIM? 
a) What is the impact of risk, in particular term premium and default risk, in the 
FISIM measurement? 
2) What factors have the biggest influence in raising the ROE of the U.S. commercial 
banking sector? 
3) What is the role of the growth in tail-end risk exposure, as represented by derivatives, 
in contributing to financial instability and the sub-prime crisis? 
 
1.4 Outline of thesis 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Chapter two presents a literature 
review discussing the past research on FISIM, including benefits and drawbacks of 
FISIM, selected theories on adjusting FISIM to reflect risk, return-boosting balance 
sheet manipulation techniques and the growth in derivatives markets for the U.S. 
commercial banking sector.  Following this I will present my hypothesis statement. 
Chapter three explains the models and methodology used in my analysis, which 
includes, 1) Calculating a standard FISIM of U.S. commercial banks following the SNA 
guidelines, 2) Calculating the FISIM of U.S. commercial banks using four different 
risk-reflected methods, 3) comparing the results of the standard and risk-reflected 
FISIM outcomes, 4) breaking down the ROE of U.S. commercial banks into separate 
components, 5) measuring the tail-end risk exposure of the U.S. commercial banking 
sector, as represented by derivatives.  Chapter four presents the results and findings of 
the analysis. Chapter five discusses the results and findings and how they serve to 
support my hypotheses.  Chapter six presents a summary, conclusions, the limitations 
of the research and recommendation for further research.  
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Chapter Two 
Literature Review 
 
Much research of late has been conducted on the nature of FISIM and the financial 
sector’s contribution to the economy especially following the sub-prime crisis. For the 
purposes of my research, I surveyed literature surrounding three issues.  First, issues 
with calculating the FISIM of the financial sector. Second, issues with manipulating 
ROE in the banking sector, including leverage and tail-end risk. Third, issues 
surrounding the effects of risk and financial innovations on financial stability.  
 The main argument of my research, that current conventions are 
misrepresenting the true nature of the financial sector, i.e. the problems associated with 
FISIM, ROE and tail-end risks, builds upon work done by Haldane, Brennan and 
Madouros in a 2010 paper titled, The Contribution of the Financial Sector, Mirage or 
Miracle? In this work, the authors present a series of facts to show that the real 
contribution of the financial sector to the UK economy is overstated. They argue that 
FISIM mismeasured banking output, and because it makes up a large percentage of the 
banking sector’s value of gross output, this in turn overstates the contribution of 
Finance as a percentage of GDP. They conclude that better measurement practices of the 
financial sector need to be developed, including adjusting the risk aspect of FISM, in 
order to better understand the position of finance in the economy, and better distinguish 
real productive growth from growth based on risk seeking.  
 Another finding of Haldane, Brennan and Madouros (2010) has to do with the 
elevated ROE of the UK’s banking sector before the crisis.  They found that by 
breaking down the ROE of the banking sector it can be seen that financial leverage was 
largely responsible for the increase in ROE. They argue that because ROE was built on 
  
29 
leverage, it is merely the illusion of increases in performance. 
My research will build upon these findings and apply them to U.S. commercial 
banks to examine how term premium and default risk effect the calculation of FISIM, 
examine the factors which fed ROE for the sector, and also examine the effects of 
increases in tail-end risk exposure 
The arguments and findings of Haldane, Brennan and Madouros have drawn 
some criticism and counter-argument. Fixler and Zieschang (2010), claim that in 
examining whether FISIM overstates the contribution of financial services to the 
economy is not as simple as the authors make it out to be.  They claim that, two parts 
are needed for this conclusion, the industry’s share in GDP and growth in volume output. 
For the first part, they agree that there has been a substantial increase in the share of 
financial services in GDP. However, they question to what extend there has been a 
similar increases in the volume of output of financial services and related to this, 
whether there has been a large price inflation in indirectly measured financial services.  
They further argue that a distinction needs to be made between risk increasing 
sector-wide on one hand, and the price and volume decomposition of that risk.  
Basically, if risk is increasing, and the banks are increasing their rates to cover this risk, 
then the prices of financial services will increase, and thus overall output of financial 
services will concomitantly increase, but this increase is not an overestimation due to 
problems with FISIM, but merely banks adjusting their rates and process to cover the 
increase in risk. This point is a key counter argument to the findings of Haldane, 
Brennan and Madouros, and my analysis of the U.S. commercial banking sector’s 
risk-reflected FISIM measurement, will serve to answer this debate, at least for the U.S 
commercial bank’s case.  
  
30 
2.1 Pros and cons of FISIM 
The introduction of FISIM was meant to address the need for measuring the value of 
financial services embedded in interest rate margins. While most agree that this as a step 
in the right direction the criticism of the standard practice of calculating FISIM is 
overwhelming.  
 A basic criticism of FISIM is that the calculations as well as the concept itself are 
overly difficult.  Haldane, Brennan and Madouros (2010) argue that it is difficult to pin 
down the value of indirect services because of their vagueness; for example, do two 
loans for $50 each represent the same level of activity as one loan for $100? They 
further argue that because FISIM is measured using conventions, rather than actual data, 
the results can lose touch with reality. In line with this argument is the argument that 
FISIM does not measure the actual value of services because it relies on aggregate data. 
Berger (2010) claims that the calculation of FISIM would ideally require determination 
of a separate reference rate for each transaction, and the identification of borrowers and 
lenders, but because this is not achievable in practice, the compromises in measurement 
give rise to a set of problems. 
Another major criticism of FISIM is the choice of reference rate used in the 
calculation. The SNA guidelines suggest the use of a single reference rate in calculating 
both loan-side and deposit-side FISIM, however, the use of a single reference rate is too 
simple to reflect the variety of loan and deposit services provided by banks, each 
carrying their own different maturities and risks (Basu, Inklaar and Wang 2008, 
Colangelo and Mink 2009, Hagino and Sonoda 2009). 
Michael Davies (2009) criticizes the SNA methodology due to its tendency to 
sometimes give implausible results, which he claims stem in part from the choice of 
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reference rate. He provides some results of experiments done in Australia regarding 
reference rate selection in which he concluded: 
1) A midpoint reference rate, between interest rate received and paid, gives less volatile 
results than an exogenous one, such as a U.S. treasury bill. 
2) When using a midpoint reference rate, a close match between assets and liabilities 
used in calculating FISIM gives a better result. 
3) The closer assets and liabilities are to equality, the better the result. 
The finding of Davies, go against the SNA methodology as well as many of the 
risk-adjusted theories discussed later in this chapter, which all use exogenous reference 
rates as opposed to a midpoint rate as Davies proposed. 
 Still another criticism of FISIM is that the current practice does not exclude 
risk from the measurement. This is a problem because if the risks in the financial sector 
are unusually high, this will tend to exaggerate the outcome (Haldane, Brenan and 
Madouros 2010, Davies 2009, Colangelo and Mink 2009, Eichmann 2009, Basu, 
Inklaar and Wang 2008). The general suggestion is to eliminate the risk element from 
the measurement of FISIM, but there is no consensus on an appropriate method for 
doing this.  I will discuss the various methods proposed in the next section. 
 
2.2 Methods of adjusting FISIM to reflect risk 
The many theories on how to adjust FISIM to reflect risk are varied, however they 
generally center on the issue of extracting the risk component from the measurement. 
The risk component is mainly concerned with the term premium and credit default risks. 
These risks are concentrated on the loan side, thus this is where most of the criticism 
focuses. The following example illustrates how these problems arise,  
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“Suppose two similar firms need to borrow money. The first issues a debt security 
and pays the market rate, which includes the term premium and default risk 
premium. The second borrows from a bank and pays interest rate charged by the 
bank. Current FISIM assumes the second corporation will only pay the risk-free 
rate, federal funds rate in the U.S. approach, and the remainder of the payment is 
considered as bank output. While both firms face similar costs of funds, only the 
payment above risk-free rate paid by the second firm is considered in the implicit 
financial services output” (Colangelo and Mink 2010, p.340). 
 Davies (2009) also illustrated this point with a breakdown of the interest 
component FISIM as conceived by the SNA and ECB (European Central Bank), as 
shown in figure 4 bellow.  
 
Figure 4 Bank interest on loans 
Source: Davies (2009)  
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He shows that in the ECB conception, term premium and default risk are included in the 
interest component rather that the services component. The justification he gives is that 
the term premium and default risk are components of interest faced by lenders and 
borrowers other than those who lend and borrow from the financial intermediaries, and 
thus should be excluded from FISIM measurement (Davies 2009, p.354).  
 However there is not universal agreement that these risks should be excluded 
from FISIM. Fixler and Zieschang (2010) claim that while FISIM is not accurate in 
estimating the implicit output, evidence for removing the risk premium from FISIM is 
weak at best. 
Wolfgang Eichmann (2009) also questions both the 1993 SNA definitions of 
the components of interest rate, and the way FISIM is defined and measured in practice 
by the ECB. He argues that the European practice of calculating FISIM, being the 
difference between the actual interest rate and the reference rate, does not measure the 
intermediation services provided by banks, but the intermediation services plus a risk 
premium. He recommends the risk premium be eliminated from the calculation, 
suggesting this new formula: 
Intermediation services10 = (Actual interest rate – risk premium) – reference rate 
Basically Eichmann redefines the calculation of FISIM as the difference between the 
risk-adjusted actual rate and the reference rate. 
 Eichmann further develops his ideas on the bearer of the risk component for 
both loans and deposits11 and offers some theoretical approaches to measuring these 
and the implications on calculating FISIM.   
                                                        
10 Eichmann used the term intermediation services to mean implicit services provided 
by financial intermediaries. 
11 Eichmann separated deposits into money and financial capital.  In his explanation, 
deposits represent financial capital, and not cash deposits. 
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For loans: Actual rate – reference rate = service +risk assumption by the bank 
For deposits: Reference rate – actual rate = risk assumption by the depositor12– service 
In order to measure the risk component, he suggests two methods, first is the ECB 
practice of adjusting interest rate to exclude address risk, currency risk, and maturity 
risk, by the use of different reference rates, as opposed to a single one suggested by the 
SNA. A second proposed method is to find a standard service component for both loans 
and deposits. In order to achieve this, for loans he suggests using the difference between 
a short-term Euribor and the risk-free actual rate of a short-term euro-denominated bank 
loan to a government. For deposits, he proposes the difference between a short-term 
Euribor and the lowest short-term actual deposit rate for financial capital. Finally, once 
the standard service component is identified, it should be subtracted form the actual 
interest rate in the loan side, and added to the actual interest rate on the deposit side. 
Colangelo and Mink (2009) also argue that term premium and credit default 
risk should be excluded from FISIM, and go on to show that theses risks had the affect 
of overstating banking sector output in Europe by an average of 37% from 2003 to 2008. 
The authors provide a framework for adjusting the term and credit default risks in 
measuring FISIM. To adjust for term premium they suggest identifying an appropriate 
“risk-free” yield curve and use this curve to extract reference rates for different 
maturities of deposits and loans. In building a “risk-free” yield curve, the suggest using 
the long-term debt securities issued by German central government for long-term 
maturities, and the secured interbank lending rate, or unsecured interbank lending rate 
and swap yield curve for short-term maturities. 
 To adjust for credit term risk on loans they suggest two methods. One method 
                                                        
12 Eichmann argues that in the case of deposits, the risk is born by the depositor, not 
the bank.  However, in the case of deposit insurance, this risk is minimized. 
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is to use the secured interbank lending rates and the swap yield curve because they 
reflect the risks of the lender rather than the borrower. Another method is to use the ratio 
of loss provisions and the outstanding amounts of the underlying loans to derive a risk 
premium on loans. 
Basu, Inklaar and Wang (2008) argue that compensation for bearing systemic 
risk should not be included in bank output. They apply some models to extract the risk 
component from FISIM and conclude that from 1997 to 2007 U.S. commercial bank 
output is overstated by 21 percent and thus leading to an overstatement of GDP by 0.3 
percent. Their models are based on the idea that a bank’s main service in making loans 
is to reduce the asymmetric information between borrowers and lenders, which the 
banks accomplish through screening and monitoring. With this in mind they argue that 
in calculating FISIM, the implicit revenue from screening and monitoring should equal 
the spread of the gross loan rate over the yield on an equally risky fixed-income security, 
and not a risk-free rate, such as U.S. Treasury security which is the current practice in 
the U.S. Figure 5 below illustrates the breakdown of interest component of bank output. 
 
Figure 5 Decomposition of bank’s total interest receipt  
Source: Basu, Inklaar and Wang 2008. 
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 With this diagram Basu, Inklaar and Wang breakdown the interest receipt of a 
bank.  “Area I represents the implicit fees for intermediation services in lending, such 
as origination and monitoring. Area II represents the loan risk premium. Area III 
represents the deposit insurance premium. Area IV represents the implicit fees for 
transaction and payment services, mostly to depositors. Area V represents the deposit 
interest payment.  With this explained the authors further extrapolates that the sum of 
areas I though V equal the banks total receipt of loan interest income. The sum of areas 
II through V equal the banks expected return on the funds given the loan’s systematic 
risk. The sum of area III through V equals the depositor’s expected return on deposits 
given the bank’s loan portfolio, if the banks have no deposit insurance. Finally, the sum 
of area IV and V equals the risk-free return x deposit balance” (Basu, Inklaar and Wang 
2008, p. 329). 
Fixler and Zieschang criticize the approach of Basu, Inklaar, and Wang because 
it relies on information symmetry between banks and credit providers, which they argue 
is not a practical assumption. Basu, Inklaar, and Wang’s approach for eliminating risk 
premium from FISIM is accomplished by separating bank loans by maturity and 
matching them with a corresponding market-based reference rate. Fixler and Zieschang 
claim this approach denies the costs banks incur in obtaining private information of 
potential borrowers. Their argument claims that by using a reference rate for bank loans 
based on credit market risk premiums will be lead to an exaggerated underestimation of 
the implicit output when calculating FISIM. 
This critique of Basu, Inklaar and Wang is extended on by Ashcroft and 
Steindel (2008), who also claim their model assumes a special case where there are no 
information problems, and thus a bank does not produce any real services to borrowers.  
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However this is not the case in most situations, as Ashcraft and Steindel argue, the use 
of market reference rate, as proposed by Basu, Inklaar and Wang, is hard to accept 
because of the difference between a bank loan, where a bank provides some services, 
and a security, which involves no service element. 
Fixler and Zieschang (2010) clash with much of the literature regarding the 
elimination of risk from FISIM, and suggest an alternative method of accounting for 
risk. They provide a detailed breakdown of FISM and argue that while the SNA’s 
method of calculating FISIM does lead to some inappropriate estimates of bank output, 
the evidence for removing risk premium from FISIM is not strong. As an alternative to 
removing risk from FISIM, they propose to calculate FISIM using current prices, 
incorporating the market value or fair value of loans as opposed to the SNA guideline of 
using book value. They do this by converting the loans to a market value equivalent, 
achieved by multiplying the stock of loans by a comparable market rate, and then 
calculating FISIM as usual.   
Hagino and Sonoda examine FISIM as measured in Japan and reach similar 
conclusion as some of the previous authors that multiple reference rates need to be 
applied to reflect the different maturities of different categories of loans and deposits.  
However they argue that credit cost, not credit risk premium should be deducted form 
FISIM.  This is because these costs reflect a failure to perform risk management 
activities and monitoring of borrowers. The authors conclude that by adjusting Japan’s 
FISIM to reflect term premium and credit costs, leads to an approximately 20 percent 
reduction. 
 Kil-hyo Ahn (2008) explains the FISIM practice in Korea where FISIM is 
calculated not only for depository corporations and financial intermediaries, but also 
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financial auxiliaries. He argues that financial auxiliaries play a similar role to financial 
intermediaries in Korea because they take deposits form customers and lend money to 
investors to buy securities.   
What can be seen in the literature regarding how to adjust FISIM to reflect risk, 
there is multitude of theories regarding reference rate, term premium and default risks, 
as well a differences in various regions and countries on how FISIM is implemented and 
calculated in practice. I will build my analysis on some of the models discussed and I 
hope to make a contribution to this body of research with my analysis of the 
risk-reflected FISIM calculation of the U.S. commercial banking sector. 
 
2.3 Return-boosting balance sheet strategies and tail-end risk 
In the aftermath of the sub-prime crisis, many have claimed the dangers or evils of new 
financial innovations and balance sheet strategies that artificially boost returns.  
Haldane, Brennan and Madouros (2010) argue that balance sheet strategies may have 
contributed to high, but temporary, excessive returns in the financial sector, which in 
turn feed the growing contribution of the financial sector to GDP. They discuss three 
types of balance sheet strategies, which prop up returns at the expense of assuming 
greater risks, including13: 
 1) Increased leverage, on and off-balance sheet 
 2) Increased share of assets held at book value 
 3) Writing deep out-of-the-money options 
They authors argue that through these techniques banks were able to hide their 
increased exposure to risk, usually in the tail of the return spectrum, due to the nature of 
                                                        
13 These appear in Haldane, Brennan and Madouros 2010, p.13 
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complex financial products as well as opaque accounting disclosures. They further 
conclude that these balance sheet strategies which led to excessive returns stem from the 
inability to measure and price risk, and thus the growth in the financial sector was 
largely a risk illusion. 
The effects of securitization on bank output through the calculation of FISIM, 
is examined in greater detail by Ashcroft and Steindel (2008). They argue that not only 
does the practice of moving loans off balance sheet increase bank returns, it also lowers 
bank output. This is because, once a bank loan is securitized, the bank stops providing 
services associated with this loan to the borrowers, which in turn increases the output of 
borrowers relative to the bank. Additionally, the bank no longer needs to pay depositors 
to finance the loan, resulting in a decrease in implicit services provided by the bank to 
depositors and a lower bank output and overall GDP of the country.    
 Derivatives have also come to light as a tool by which banks can boost returns 
while silently increasing their tail-end risks. Caouette, Altman, Narayanan and Nimmo 
(2008), describe derivatives as a tool to help banks deal with their paradoxical desire to 
enjoy the benefits of asset concentration with out having to face the attendant risks.  
They argue that while credit derivatives have offered many benefits to banks and capital 
markets, they also have a dark side. Derivatives increase the distance between the 
borrower and the ultimate lender, which decreases incentives to monitor, and increases 
moral hazard. Another issue they argue is that derivates can in some cases give 
incentive to destroy corporate values, because a trading position that benefits from a 
decline in credit worthiness may be desirable in some cases. Furthermore because much 
of the derivatives market is unregulated, it is difficult to know all the players involved in 
a transaction and their incentives. Finally, derivatives can create systemic problems 
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when used excessive to build up leverage. 
 Davis (1995) gives a counter argument for derivatives, claiming that they 
should act to increase overall financial stability.  This is because they perform the 
function of spreading risk and the management of risk across many parties, as opposed 
to having them concentrated on one balance sheet.  Thus they may help to diffuse the 
impact of shocks.  However he also argues that derivatives have a down side in that the 
market is relativity new, they carry counterparty, market and liquidity risks, and they 
lack of transparency. 
 All of the literature surveyed regarding return boosting balance sheet strategies 
and tail-end risk conclude that these practices falsify the true position of the firm or 
bank by increasing returns at the expense of increasing risks. I also build upon this body 
of research by examining the case of the U.S commercial banking sector and its 
involvement in some of these techniques and financial products.   
 
2.4 Relationship between risk and financial fragility 
The relationship between risk and financial crisis is rooted in fundamental economic 
theory. Keynes in his seminal work, the General Theory of Employment, Interest and 
Money (1935) argued that investment is based on the marginal efficiency of capital, 
which states that prospective yield should be larger that the replacement costs in making 
an investment. Furthermore, this investment is affected by risks, both borrowers and 
lenders, which tend to be underestimated in booming times, in part due to short-period 
changes in the state of long-term expectations based on animal spirits, as well as interest 
rate changes. Keynes theories have spawned a horde of ideas build upon his work, some 
of which I will now briefly discuss. 
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 Building on the theories of Keynes and Fisher, Minsky (1975, 1977) argues 
that the economy is in a fragile financial structure, and that crisis is to be expected.  He 
argues, that since the end of World War II the structure has shifted from a robust to 
fragile state due to changes in the way investments and capital assets are financed in the 
economy.  He further argues that our economy is in a state of systemic fragility, or that 
the economy is functioning as it is designed to, and thus our economy is prone to 
experiencing repeated financial crises.  He develops a model by which a financial 
crisis happens: 
 “A financial crisis starts when some unit cannot refinance its position through 
 normal channels and is forced to raise cash by unconventional instruments or 
 by trying to sell out its position. Inasmuch as the assets in position have thin 
 markets, excess supply leads to a sharp price break. Once this occurs the initial 
 disequilibrium is made worse. Other units experience a decrease in asset values 
 and thus have difficulty in making position.” (Minsky 1977, p. 140) 
This model developed by Minsky fits very will with the sub-prime crisis, and therefore 
can help explain the impact of the growth of derivatives in the U.S. banking sector. 
 Kindleberger (2000) builds on the models of Fisher and Minsky providing 
much to this body of knowledge. In his book, Manias, Panics and Crashes, he develops 
the concept of displacements, which act as an object of speculation. He defines a 
displacement as some outside event that changes horizons, expectations, profit 
opportunities, or behavior, and he includes the growth in financial innovations and 
derivatives in this category (p. 41). He comments that toward the end of the cycle, 
speculation tends to detach from reality and people seek to become rich with no 
understanding of the process involved.  Kindleberger’s contribution can also aid in 
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explaining of the impact of the growth of depravities among U.S. commercial banks.   
 Davis (1995) contributes much to the discussion of financial fragility, adding 
the aspect of competition.  In his book Debt, Financial Fragility and Systemic Risk, he 
argues that many factors combined can create a situation of financial fragility and lead 
to a crisis, including: reductions in the barriers to entry in the form of deregulation, 
innovation, opening of new markets, technology increases, developments in existing 
markets.  Additionally, the new entry of firms, including entry into new markets by 
existing firms, lower process in credit markets (declining risk premiums), low or 
declining capitalization, higher quantities in credit markets, exploitation of safety-net 
protection and low value of banking franchises also have effects of increasing instability. 
He analyses several financial crises in which these factors can explain the process by 
which financial crisis unfolds.  In my analysis I will apply the framework provided by 
Davis to analyze the role of financial innovations, mainly derivatives in the sub-prime 
crisis. 
 As Keynes, Minsky, Kindleberger and Davis have argued or implied, financial 
crisis and are part of our economic system, and that excessive risk taking plays a key 
role in the boom and bust of the business cycle. These theories generally argue that 
financial crises are due to some exogenous shock in the system, that shock is different 
depending on the crisis. While all these theories were written well before the advent, or 
popularization of many of the structured financial products, which where are at the heart 
of the recent financial crisis, they are still very relevant, and can be used to explain the 
impact of financial innovations in the recent sub-prime crisis. In my analysis, I apply 
some of these theories, especially that of Davis, to explain the role of derivatives, in the 
recent crisis. The increased use of these innovations combined with the increased 
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competition in the banking sector, as seen in the steady increase of banking charters 
issued, is one possible cause of the recent financial crisis. 
 
2.5 Hypothesis statement 
My hypotheses are as follows: 
Hypothesis 1: Adjusting the calculation of the loan-side FISIM of the U.S. 
commercial banking sector to reflect term premium and default risk will lead to a 
reduction in loan-side FISIM 
Hypothesis 2: The high ROE of the U.S commercial banking sector reported in the 
years 1994 to 2003, was mainly due to an increase in the assumption of risk in the 
form of financial leverage. 
Hypothesis 3: The increase in tail-end risk exposure, as represented by financial 
innovations of derivatives, in combination with increased competition in the banking 
sector, contributed to increased to financial instability and the recent sub-prime crisis. 
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Chapter Three 
Framework and Methodology 
 
 
In proving my main argument, that the U.S. banking sector is misrepresented by 
standard measures of FISIM, ROE and the growth of tail-end risk, I will conduct a 
Five-part analysis: 
1) Calculate standard FISIM of the U.S. commercial banking sector, following the 
SNA and BEA guidelines. The findings of this analysis will contribute to 
answering hypothesis 1. 
2) Calculate a risk-reflected FISIM of the U.S. commercial banking sector, following 
four previously developed approaches. The findings of this analysis will contribute 
to answering hypothesis 1.  
3) Compare the outcomes of the standard and risk-reflected FISIM approaches, and 
interpret the results. The findings of this analysis will contribute to answering 
hypothesis 1. 
4) Separate the ROE of U.S. commercial banks into four components and examine 
which component or mix of components is responsible for the temporary high 
ROE in the late 1990’s and early 2000’s. The findings of this analysis will 
contribute to answering hypothesis 2. 
5) Examine the increase in derivatives and competition in the U.S. commercial 
banking sector. The findings of this analysis will contribute to answering 
hypothesis 3. 
 The main source of data for this research is aggregate data of the U.S. 
commercial banking sector, including balance sheet and income statements obtained 
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form the FDIC (Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation) online database, 14  and 
compiled using Excel. All other sources of other data are referenced with a footnote, and 
explanation if necessary. The following is a detailed explanation of the models and 
methods used in each of the five analyses. 
 
3.1 Standard calculation of FISIM of the U.S commercial banking sector 
In calculating the standard FISIM for U.S commercial banking sector, I followed the 
SNA guideline, and BEA recommendations, which is consistent with current practice in 
the U.S., as discussed earlier. I will provide explanation and justification in place where 
my methods differed. The standard FISIM calculation is as follows: 
Calculating FISIM 
Total implicit output = output of depositor’s services + output of borrower’s services  
Output of depositor’s services = (reference rate - average rate paid) x average liability 
balance15 
Output of borrower’s services = (average rate received – reference rate) x average asset 
balance16 
Calculation of average rates (these are all based on Book Values) 
Average rate paid = (interest expense / average liability balance) 
Average rate received = (interest income / average asset balance) 
Choice of reference rate 
As discussed earlier, the SNA requires a reference rate reflecting the pure cost of 
borrowing, but does not recommend a specific rate. Therefore, for the purposes of this 
                                                        
14 The data was downloaded from the FDIC Statistics on Depository Institutions 
division, (http://www2.fdic.gov/sdi/index.asp) 
15 For average liability balance I used the total deposits in domestic & foreign. 
16 For average asset balance, I used the gross loans and leases 
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analysis, I used three reference rates, the Federal funds rate, or inter-bank lending rate, 
the 3-month U.S. Government Treasury bill, and the 7-year U.S. Government Treasury 
bill, to show the difference in possible alternatives that can be used in the U.S. while 
still meeting the SNA guidelines. The three rates used reflect different risk-free rates for 
different maturities. Table 1 below provides the data used in this analysis and the 
following risk-adjusted calculations of FISIM.  The results are shown in section 4.1. 
 Table 1 Loans, deposits and interest data for U.S. commercial banks, 1992 to 2010 
Year 
Gross 
Loans 
and 
Leases 
Total 
Deposits 
Domestic 
& Foreign 
Total 
Interest 
Income 
Total 
Interest 
Expense 
Average 
Rate Paid 
Average 
Rate 
Received 
1992 2041 2,699 185 122 4.52% 9.06% 
1993 2157 2,754 179 106 3.85% 8.30% 
1994 2366 2,874 190 111 3.86% 8.03% 
1995 2611 3,028 227 148 4.89% 8.69% 
1996 2820 3,197 240 150 4.69% 8.51% 
1997 2979 3,422 257 165 4.82% 8.63% 
1998 3241 3,681 274 179 4.86% 8.45% 
1999 3493 3,831 280 175 4.57% 8.02% 
2000 3818 4,180 330 225 5.38% 8.64% 
2001 3887 4,378 309 188 4.29% 7.95% 
2002 4160 4,690 276 121 2.58% 6.63% 
2003 4432 5,035 263 95 1.89% 5.93% 
2004 4910 5,593 269 97 1.73% 5.48% 
2005 5385 6,073 333 165 2.72% 6.18% 
2006 5984 6,731 419 263 3.91% 7.00% 
2007 6629 7,310 461 308 4.21% 6.95% 
2008 6841 8,082 398 211 2.61% 5.82% 
2009 6499 8,333 369 122 1.46% 5.68% 
2010 6597 8,514 381 89 1.05% 5.78% 
All numbers rounded to nearest billion!  
Source: FDIC, and author’s calculations 
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3.2 Risk-reflected calculation of FISIM of the U.S. commercial banking sector 
After getting the standard FISIM of the U.S. commercial banking sector, I employed a 
similar method used by Davies (2010),17 applying a variety of methods for calculating 
FISIM, to a common data set, and interpreting the results. For the following four 
risk-reflected methods of calculating FISIM I used the same balance sheet and income 
statement data used in the standard calculation, as shown in table 1. This includes loan 
and deposit balances as well as interest income and interest expense.  The following is 
a detailed description of each method. For the purposes of this analysis, I focused on the 
loan-side FISIM calculation because this is where the majority of risks are embedded, 
as discussed in the literature review. 
 
3.2.1 Eichmann’s approach 
This approach involves identifying a standard service component for both loans and 
deposits, and subtracting this form the actual interest rate in the loan side, and adding it 
to the actual interest rate on the deposit side. For the standard service component of 
loans, Eichmann suggests using the difference between a short-term Euribor, and the 
risk-free actual rate of a short-term euro-denominated bank loan to a government. For 
the service component of deposits, he proposes the difference between a short-term 
Euribor and the lowest short-term actual deposit rate for financial capital. His equations 
are as follows: 
(Actual interest rate – risk premium) – reference rate = intermediation services 
For loans: Actual rate – reference rate = service + risk assumption by the bank 
For deposits: Reference rate – actual rate = risk assumption by the depositor – service 
                                                        
17 Davies calculated the FISM of Australian banks using different references rates on 
the same data set,as discussed earlier in the literature review.  
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In order to find the service component for U.S. commercial banks, I used the 
U.S. equivalents of the variables in Eichmann’s equations. Table 2 below provides the 
Eichmann variables and my substituted U.S. equivalents.  
Table 2 Eichmann’s variables and their U.S. equivalents 
Eichmann Variable U.S. Equivalent 
Short-term Euribor 6-month Treasury Bill 
Short-term Euro dominated loan to a 
government 
Bank Prime rate 
Lowest short-term actual deposit for 
financial capital 
1-month Certificate of Deposit 
 
In order to find the service component of FISIM for U.S commercial banks, I 
adjusting Eichmann’s equation to incorporate the U.S equivalents as follows;  
Service component of Loans = bank prime rate – 6-month Treasury bill 
Service component of Deposits= 1-month Certificate of deposit - 6-month Treasury bill 
After converting Eichmann’s equation to a U.S. equivalent, I plugged U.S. commercial 
bank data into the equation and calculated the result, which is shown in section 4.2. 
 
3.2.2 Fixler and Zieschang’s approach 
Fixler and Zieschang propose to eliminate the risk component of FISIM by calculating 
FISIM using current prices; this effectively incorporates the market or fair value of 
loans as opposed to the SNA guideline of using book value. The authors provide the 
following equation to show their risk-adjusted FISIM; 
Loan interest receivables – (reference rate x the market value of loans) 
In following the methods developed by Fixler and Zieschang to convert the 
loans to market value, I first separated the loans reported on balance sheets by the banks, 
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into four categories, and calculated the market rate for each category by multiplying the 
balance of each category of loans by a market interest rate roughly matching the average 
maturity of each loan category. This information is summarized in table 3 below.  
Table 3 Breakdown of loans and corresponding market reference rates 
Loan Category Market rate 
Secured by Real Estate 
(SRC) 
Freddie Mac 30-year mortgage rate 
(FM 30) 
Commercial and Industrial 
(C&I) 
3-month non-financial commercial paper   
(3-moCP) 
To individuals 
(I) 
Credit card loan rates 
(CC) 
All Other Loans 
(OL) 
Average interest received on all loans  (Ave 
Int) 
 
After calculating a market rate for each loan category, I used a 
weighted-average of each loan category and plugged the data into the equation provided 
by Fixler and Zieschang as follows; 
Loan interest receivable – (reference rate x ((SRC x FM30) + (C&I x 3-moCP) + (I x 
CC) + (OL x Ave Int)) 
The result of the previous equation was calculated giving the market value of the U.S. 
commercial banking sector’s loans, or the Fixler & Zieschang risk-reflected loan-side 
FISIM output. The results for this analysis are presented in section 4.2. 
 
3.2.3 Colangelo and Mink’s approach 
To adjust FISIM output for term premium, Colangelo and Mink suggest identifying an 
appropriate “risk-free” yield curve and use this curve to extract reference rates for 
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different maturities, of deposits, and fixation periods for loans. In building a “risk-free” 
yield curve, the suggest using the long-term debt securities issued by German central 
government for long-term maturities, and the secured interbank lending rate, or 
unsecured interbank lending rate and swap yield curve for short-term maturities. 
To adjust for credit default risk on loans the authors suggest two methods.  
One method is to use the secured interbank lending rates and the swap yield curve 
because they reflect the risks of the lender rather than the borrower. Another method is 
to use the ratio of loss provisions and the outstanding amounts of the underlying loans 
to derive a risk premium on loans, I choose to use the later due to data availability. 
 Applying this to U.S. commercial banks requires again converting the author’s 
variables to U.S. equivalents, which I provide as follows: 
German central government long –term debt securities! 7-year U.S. Treasury bill 
Secured interbank lending rate! federal funds rate 
Swap yield curve! 7-year U.S. Treasury Bill yield curve 
Ratio of loss provision to outstanding amount of underlying loan! percentage of loss 
provision reported to gross loans   
 After getting these variables, I then separated the loans into the same four 
categories previously used, and calculated the term premium and default risk premium 
as shown in table 4 below. 
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Table 4 Colangelo and Mink’s term premium and default risk adjustments 
Loan Category Term premium 
adjustment 
Default risk and term premium adjustment 
Secured by Real 
Estate 
(SRC) 
10-year U.S. 
Treasury bill 
Federal reserve average mortgages rates (FEDM) less 
5-year U.S. Treasury bill Plus 10-year U.S. Treasury 
bill 
Commercial and 
Industrial 
(C&I) 
3-month 
Commercial 
Paper 
3-month non-financial commercial paper  (3-moCP) 
less 5-year U.S. Treasury bill Plus 1-year U.S. Treasury 
bill 
To individuals 
(I) 
3-year U.S. 
treasury bill 
aaa rated bonds (aaa) less 5-year U.S. Treasury bill Plus 
3-year U.S. Treasury bill 
All Other Loans 
(OL) 
Average of 
above three 
Average interest received on all loans  (Ave Int) less 
5-year U.S. Treasury bill Plus 3-year U.S. Treasury bill 
 
 Once these variables were converted to U.S. equivalents, I then calculated the 
Colangelo and Mink risk-reflected loan-side FISIM by adding the total of each loan 
category for both term premium and default risk and subtracting these from the Risk 
free, or standard FISIM (which uses the federal fund rate as a reference rate). The result 
is presented in section 4.2. 
 
3.2.4 Basu, Inklaar and Wang’s approach  
To extract the risk component, the authors suggest separating bank loans by maturity 
and matching them with a corresponding reference rates. To approximate term premium, 
the authors match the average maturity of the loan category with a U.S. treasury bill of 
approximate equal maturity as a reference rate. For the default risk premium, the 
authors match the approximate risks of each category with an equally risky market rate.  
In applying this approach to my data set of U.S. commercial banks entails, I chose to 
use similar market reference rates as with Colangelo and Mink’s method, with slight 
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changes. Table 5 below summarizes this information. 
Table 5 Basu, Inklaar and Wang’s term premium and default risk adjustments 
Loan Category Term Premium Reference rate Default risk Reference Rate 
Secured by Real Estate 
(SRC) 
10 year U.S. treasury bill Freddie Mac 30-year 
mortgage rate 
Commercial and Industrial 
(C&I) 
1-year U.S. treasury bill aaa corporate bonds 
To individuals 
(I) 
3-year U.S. treasury bill bbb corporate bonds 
All Other Loans 
(OL) 
Average of above three rates Average of above there 
rates 
 
 After getting these variables, I calculated the loan-side FISIM by adding the 
total of each loan category for both term premium and default risk and subtracting these 
from the risk-free, or standard FISIM (which uses the federal fund rate as a reference 
rate). The result is presented in section 4.2. 
 
3.3 Breakdown of ROE for the U.S. commercial banking sector 
To examine the source of the record high ROE of the U.S. commercial banking sector in 
the years leading up to the sub-prime crisis, I will apply data of the U.S. Commercial 
banking sector, to an equation proposed by Haldane, Brennan and Madouros (2010). I 
chose the timeframe 1992 to 2010, to analyze bank ROE because this period is 
sandwiched between two crisis, the savings and loan crisis of the 80’s and 90’ and the 
sub-prime crisis from 2008, and in this period the commercial banking sector reported 
record-high ROE at or above 14% in the years 1994, 1999, and 2003. The source of the 
data is the FDIC online database, and includes some details taken from aggregate 
balance sheet and income statements from 1992 to 2010. In particular, total assets, tier 1 
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capital, common equity, net income and risk-weighted assets. All values were taken as 
stated on the balance sheets or income statements except common equity, which was 
calculated as: 
Total equity - preferred stock 
All data was compiled using excel and inserted into the Haldane equation discussed 
below. 
 Before separating the ROE I provide a simplified calculation of the ROE of the 
U.S commercial banking sector for the same timeframe, 1992 to 2010. This ROE 
follows the standard approach of: 
ROE =  Pre-tax net operating profit - applicable income taxes  
                    Total equity capital 
Then I match this with the Haldane equation for ROE in order to show the parity. 
 Following this, I employ the Haldane equation and separate the ROE of the U.S. 
commercial banking sector into its four components, financial leverage, common equity 
margin, return on risk-weighted assets, and unit risk. The equation is shown below, and 
the results are presented in section 4.3. 
ROE =    Total assets  x    Tier 1 capital        x Net income  x    RWAs 
  Tier 1 capital      Common equity          RWA       Total assets 
ROE = Financial leverage x Common equity margin  x  RoRWAs   x  Unit-risk 
 The equation relies on some assumptions, for instance the definition of 
risk-weighted assets, and how these risks are accounted for. I will discuss this and other 
limitations as well as explain the meaning and significance of each of the four parts of 
the equation in the discussion of results in the following chapters. 
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3.4 Measuring tail-end risk and competition in U.S. commercial banks 
To examine the banking sector’s increasing exposure to tail-end risk, I once again used 
the balance sheet and income statement data collected from the FDIC online database 
and analyzed the growth in the levels of derivatives reported. I used derivatives to 
represent tail-end risk in this analysis because these data are readily available from the 
FDIC database, and this category of ‘asset’ includes, many tail-end risk heavy products, 
such as: 
-Interest rate contracts 
-Futures and forward contracts 
-Written option contracts 
-Purchased option contracts 
-Foreign exchange rate contracts 
-Commitments to purchase foreign currencies and U.S. dollar exchange 
-Spot foreign exchange rate contracts 
-Contracts on other commodities and equities 
I compared the total amount of derivatives reported to the total assets, as well as the 
percentage of derivatives to total assets.  
 In order to measure the competition in the U.S. commercial banking sector, I 
collected data from the FDIC online database on new charters issued per year. The data 
for both derivatives and new charters were compiled using Excel and then applied to the 
framework provided by Davis (1995) to see the wellness of fit in Davis’s theory, which 
examines the relationship between financial innovations, competition and other factors 
to financial fragility.  The results are presented in section 4.4.  
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Chapter Four 
Results and Findings 
 
 
This Chapter explains the results and findings of each of the analyses, using figures and 
tables where necessary to aid in understanding.   
 
4.1 Standard FISIM of U.S. commercial banking sector 
The result of a simple risk-free calculation of the total FISIM of U.S. commercial banks, 
following the SNA and BEA methods, is represented in figure 6 below. This figure 
compiles the results of three different reference rates, which could be used in practice in 
the U.S. These include the interbank lending rate, or federal funds rate, as well as the 
3-month and 7-year treasury bills; all three represent a near risk-free rate of different 
maturities. 
 
Figure 6 Total FISIM using three risk-free reference rates 
Source: FDIC and author’s calculations 
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The basic finding of this analysis conveys conventional wisdom that when 
calculating FISIM, using a reference rate with a longer maturity, generally offering a 
higher yield, translates to higher FISIM output. Furthermore, the difference in the 
outcomes of the three reference rates in this simple calculation of FISM depend entirely 
on the reference rate used, as this was the only variable which was changed. The first 
two reference rates used, the Federal funds rate and 3-month Treasury bond, resulted in 
nearly identical FISIM outputs every year, due to the closeness of the two rates. 
However, the gap widens, however slightly, between these first two FISIM outcomes 
and the third, which uses the 7-year Treasury bond as a reference rate. For the 7-year 
bond, the total FISIM output is matched in some places and exceeds the other two rates 
in other years. The relationship between reference rate and output is simply a function 
of the FISIM equation; a higher reference rate leads to a higher output. Table 6 below 
provides a breakdown of the output of deposits and loans for each reference rate. 
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Table 6 Standard FISIM outcomes using three risk-free reference rates 
Federal funds rate 3-month U.S. treasury bill 7-year U.S. treasury bill 
Year 
Deposits Loans Total Deposits Loans Total Deposits Loans Total 
1992 -27.00  113.16  86.16  -27.27  113.36  86.10  27.52  71.93  87.03  
1993 -22.83  113.86  91.03  -21.45  112.78  91.33  46.57  59.50  73.08  
1994 10.00  90.39  100.39  14.59  86.61  101.20  87.59  26.51  144.88  
1995 28.53  74.78  103.31  23.38  79.22  102.60  48.82  57.29  110.03  
1996 19.44  90.54  109.98  14.65  94.77  109.42  52.69  61.21  121.12  
1997 21.84  94.35  116.19  12.94  102.09  115.04  51.61  68.43  154.49  
1998 17.93  100.61  118.54  1.74  114.87  116.60  15.36  102.88  93.11  
1999 15.40  106.40  121.80  8.12  113.03  121.16  46.81  77.76  140.10  
2000 35.83  91.76  127.59  35.83  91.76  127.59  34.16  93.28  153.47  
2001 -18.13  158.18  140.05  -35.65  173.73  138.09  25.65  119.31  122.77  
2002 -42.68  206.53  163.85  -44.08  207.78  163.69  80.67  97.12  187.66  
2003 -38.10  212.92  174.81  -43.14  217.35  174.21  82.23  106.99  161.22  
2004 -21.49  202.72  181.22  -18.70  200.26  181.56  119.45  78.98  228.97  
2005 30.55  159.60  190.15  30.55  159.60  190.15  87.03  109.52  221.19  
2006 71.53  121.60  193.13  63.45  128.78  192.23  57.40  134.16  219.43  
2007 58.96  128.22  187.19  19.49  164.02  183.51  21.68  162.03  202.82  
2008 -55.83  266.65  210.83  -97.85  302.23  204.37  45.20  181.14  230.93  
2009 -108.67  358.60  249.93  -109.50  359.25  249.75  112.99  185.73  321.15  
2010 -73.67  369.13  295.45  -77.08  371.76  294.68  134.07  208.16  134.07  
Source: FDIC and author’s calculations 
 By looking at the FISIM output of deposits and loans seperately, we can see 
some more interesting results. Figures 7 and 8 below give the FISIM of deposits and 
loans respectively.  For deposits, the higher reference rate in general resulted in a 
higher output. However on the loan side, the higher reference rate leads to a much lower 
output. The reasons for this is again embeded in the FISIM equation. Deposit-side is 
(reference rate - average rate paid) x balance of deposits, while loan-side is (average 
rate received - reference rate) x balance of loans. The average rate paid should be lower 
than the average rate received, or the bank is not making profit. Therefore, applying the 
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same reference rate to both deposit and loans will give this result. This highlights some 
of the issues previously mentiond about the problems in using of a single reference rate. 
 
Figure 7 Deposit-side FISIM using three risk-free reference rates 
Source: FDIC and author’s calculations 
 
Figure 8 Loan-side FISIM using three risk-free reference rates 
Source: FDIC and author’s calculations 
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4.2 Risk-reflected loan-side FISIM of U.S. commercial banking sector 
The four different risk-reflected calculations of loan-side FISIM of the U.S. commercial 
banking sector, is represented in figure 9 below. This figure compiles the results of the 
four methods developed by Eichmann, Fixler and Zieschang, Colangelo and mink and 
finally Basu, Inklaar and Wang. The four methods result in a wide range of FISIM 
outcomes, all generally below the risk-free FISIM outcome, except for the years of 2000, 
and 2005-2007. Figure 9 below summarizes the results, compared to the standard 
loan-side FISIM result (which uses the federal funds rate as a reference rate).  Table 7 
below provides the same information 
 
 
Figure 9 Standard (using risk-free reference rate) and risk-reflected FISIM outcomes 
Source: FDIC and author’s calculations 
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Table 7 Summary of standard and risk-reflected FISIM outcomes 
Year 
Standard 
FISIM  
(using Fed 
fund rate) 
Eichmann 
Fixler & 
Zieschang 
Colangelo & 
Mink 
Wang, Basu 
& Inklaar 
1992 113.16 52.86 71.15 55.77 18.23 
1993 113.86 59.96 65.92 55.69 24.51 
1994 90.39 54.89 56.03 28.69 -11.27 
1995 74.78 78.59 65.81 40.13 34.41 
1996 90.54 84.04 69.26 47.72 30.38 
1997 94.35 90.86 82.81 57.57 43.84 
1998 100.61 107.93 90.22 68.95 58.47 
1999 106.40 106.54 97.56 53.47 19.70 
2000 91.76 116.83 111.05 50.13 42.93 
2001 158.18 134.49 136.59 83.51 36.95 
2002 206.53 122.72 131.47 66.50 17.83 
2003 212.92 134.73 122.96 58.60 12.98 
2004 202.72 134.04 116.06 34.31 -2.37 
2005 159.60 144.86 148.36 52.50 23.89 
2006 121.60 177.13 191.42 57.46 64.00 
2007 128.22 227.37 209.25 64.90 73.38 
2008 266.65 234.65 210.04 45.06 15.40 
2009 358.60 193.02 207.98 98.19 37.78 
2010 369.13 201.21 184.54 116.27 71.61 
Source: FDIC and author’s calculations 
 
4.2.1 Eichmann’s approach 
Eichmann’s risk-adjusted approach in general yielded a lower loan-side FISIM 
compared to the risk-free calculation, except for 1995, 1998-2000, and 2006-2007, as 
shown in figure 10 below. This result can be explained by looking at the Eichmann 
equation ((average rate received – service component) – risk-free rate) x loans. He 
further defines the (Actual rate – reference rate) = (service + risk assumption by bank). 
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This means that if the service or risk assumption of the bank is increasing, then the 
output will decrease. This is because increasing the rate from which the reference rate is 
subtracted will lower output. 
 Relating the result from Eichmann’s method to the timeline of the sub-prime 
crisis is more difficult. Eichmann’s outcome follows a steady increase, possibly due to 
the increasing amount of loans in the banking sector, with a drop after 2008. 
 
Figure 10 Eichmann’s risk-reflected loan-side FISIM 
Source: FDIC and author’s calculations 
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The higher than risk-free outcomes of 2000 and 2006-2007 can be explained due to the 
unusually high federal funds rate in those years, which as previously discussed will act 
to lower the FISIM output. The market value rate used in calculating the loans remains 
stable; therefore the fluctuations in the federal funds rate can explain the result. A 
possible implication of this is that during these periods, banks were for some reason 
unable to increase the risk premium to cover the risks, and thus not able to follow the 
risk-free rate.  Possible reasons for this include increased competition among banks 
and interest rate policies of FRB, which will be discussed in the next chapter 
 
Figure 11 Fixler and Zieschang’s risk-reflected loan-side FISIM 
Source: FDIC and author’s calculations 
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my maturity and applying a corresponding reference rate, as opposed to a single 
reference rate.  However, this result dramatically reduces the loan-side FISIM output, 
as shown in figure 12. The results can be explained by looking at the way the authors 
conceive of and measure both term premium and default risk. For term premium they 
substitute the single reference rate for one matching the average maturity of the loan 
category, switching the federal funds rate for a variety of U.S. treasury bills 
corresponding to the matching maturity. However, to account for the default premium, 
the authors substitute the reference rate for a market equivalent that matches the risks of 
the loan category. A rate from the market will in general be higher than the federal funds 
rate, although carry more risk, so this will automatically lead to a reduced FISIM output, 
but the decrease in FISIM is very dramatic and may require further research to confirm 
the author’s model. 
 
Figure 12 Colangelo and Mink’s risk-reflected loan-side FISIM 
Source: FDIC and author’s calculations 
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4.2.4 Basu, Inklaar and Wang’s risk-adjusted approach 
This approach gives by far the most striking reduction in the FISIM of U.S. commercial 
banks. The authors propose to reflect the term premium and default risk in the standard 
FISIM calculation, however, their method gives a much lower, and sometimes negative 
loan-side FISIM outcome, as shown in figure 13 below.   
 
 
Figure 13 Basu, Inklaar and Wang’s risk-reflected loan-side FISIM 
Source: FDIC and author’s calculations 
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 Additionally there is the presence of a negative FISIM of the years 1994 and 2004.  
Some have argued that a negative FSIIM should not happen in most circumstances, and 
that observation of a negative FISIM is due to flaws in the measurement instrument, the 
choice of an inappropriate reference rate, or through the application of an aggregate 
measure to a detailed component (Berger 2010).  However, if FISIM is adjusted to 
reflect term premium and default risk, it is possible to have a negative loan-side FISIM.  
 
4.3 Breakdown of ROE of U.S. commercial banking sector 
The results of the ROE breakdown for the U.S. commercial banking sector compared to 
the simple ROE, is presented in figure 14 below. The results show that the combined 
components of the Haldane ROE equation correspond closely with the Simple ROE 
previously calculated, with only slight differences. The parity of these two ROE 
calculations is necessary to confirm the results of the breakdown of ROE 
 
Figure 14 Simple and Haldane ROE of U.S. commercial banking sector, 1992 to 2010 
Source: FDIC and author’s calculations 
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The breakdown of ROE into the four components is shown in figure 15 below.  
The results show a peak in financial leverage in 2008, followed by the steep drop 2009 
and 2010. However there is no correspondingly significant movement in any of the 
other factors.   
 
Figure 15 Breakdown of ROE of U.S. commercial banking sector, 1992 to 2010.  
Source: FDIC, and author’s calculations 
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Table 8 Breakdown of ROE of U.S. commercial banking sector, 1992 to 2010 
Year 
Total ROE 
Financial 
Leverage 
(times) 
Common 
Equity 
Margin RoRWAs Unit Risk 
2010 5.74% 11.68  76.04% 0.93% 69.50% 
2009 -0.88% 11.96  75.92% -0.13% 73.91% 
2008 1.33% 14.03  76.43% 0.17% 73.29% 
2007 8.58% 13.77  71.34% 1.13% 77.01% 
2006 12.51% 13.30  74.05% 1.65% 76.94% 
2005 12.56% 13.11  76.02% 1.63% 77.45% 
2004 12.32% 13.35  74.71% 1.65% 74.78% 
2003 14.97% 13.26  83.61% 1.80% 74.92% 
2002 13.94% 13.23  83.40% 1.67% 75.56% 
2001 12.58% 13.07  85.06% 1.46% 77.43% 
2000 13.43% 13.50  87.80% 1.44% 78.78% 
1999 15.01% 13.36  90.10% 1.58% 78.92% 
1998 13.47% 13.61  87.00% 1.47% 77.49% 
1997 14.23% 13.66  88.41% 1.54% 76.35% 
1996 14.01% 13.46  91.11% 1.53% 74.70% 
1995 14.02% 13.37  92.73% 1.54% 73.28% 
1994 14.36% 13.32  96.92% 1.55% 71.54% 
1993 14.59% 13.27  94.68% 1.63% 71.35% 
1992 12.22% 14.01  95.57% 1.26% 72.51% 
Source: FDIC and author’s calculations 
 
4.4 Increased tail-end risk exposure and competition among U.S. commercial 
banks 
The results of this analysis show the derivatives18 reported among U.S. commercial 
                                                        
18 As previously discusses, this includes: interest rate contracts, futures and forward 
contracts, written option contracts, purchased option contracts, foreign exchange rate 
contracts, commitments to purchase foreign currencies and U.S. dollar exchange, spot 
foreign exchange rate contracts and contracts on other commodities and equities 
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banks, have grown nearly exponentially from 1992 to 2010, taking only a short pause in 
2008 for the sub-prime crisis, as previously show in figure 2. 
 In 1992 the total assets reported by the U.S. commercial banking sector was 
around $3,506 billion dollars, and this grew to around $12,066 billion in 2010. However, 
the growth in derivatives far outpaced this growth. In 1992 derivatives reported by the 
sector were around $8,765 billion, or roughly 2.5 times the amount of total assets 
reported by the sector, see figure 16. This is in stark contrast to 2010, when total assets 
reported were around $12,066 billion and derivatives topped $232,190 billion, or 
roughly 19 times the total assets. This is a large increase in a group of assets that carry 
large tail-end risks.  
 
Figure 16 Derivatives as a percentage of total assets for U.S. commercial banking sector, 
1992 to 2010 
Source: FDIC 
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scandal of the 80’s and 90’s new charters were held under 50 per year.  However this 
starts to increase around 1994, peaking around 230 in 1999. A drop in new charters and 
a subsequent increase peaking again in 2008 at around 175 follow this increase. When 
the sub-prime crisis started unfolding, and banks began failing, as previously shown in 
figure 3, new charters came to a abrupt halt approaching zero in 2010, see figure 17 
below.   
 
Figure 17 New charters issued in U.S. commercial banking sector, 1992 to 2010 
Source: FDIC 
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Chapter Five 
Discussion of Results 
 
 
Most of the results presented thus far confirm my main argument of my research, that 
current conventions are misrepresenting the true nature of the financial sector, i.e. the 
problems associated with FISIM, ROE and tail-end risks. I will now discuss the results 
in relation to how they serve to prove or disprove my hypotheses.  
 
5.1 Answering Hypothesis 1 
Hypothesis 1: Adjusting the calculation of the loan-side FISIM of the U.S. 
commercial banking sector to reflect term premium and default risk will lead to a 
reduction in loan-side FISIM 
This hypothesis was largely confirmed by the results presented comparing the standard 
to risk-reflected FISIM outcomes, as shown in figure 9 and table 7. However, this 
hypothesis was not completely confirmed due to the few in which the risk-reflected 
FISIM outcomes of Eichmann and Fixler and Zieschang was higher than the standard 
FISIM, see figures 10 and 11 respectively.  As discussed earlier, the presence of a 
risk-reflected FISIM outcome which is higher then the standard risk-free FISIM is 
possibly indicating a period when banks are not to increase their risk premium to cover 
the risks in the sector.  This could be due to excessive competition, which forces banks 
to aggressively compete for deposit and loan customers (Davis 1995, p. 219), or due to 
excessively low interest rate policy of the FRB. 
As discussed many times over in this paper, the discussion in regard to the 
FISIM output of U.S. commercial banks centers around two issues, the choice of and 
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use of reference rate and the issue of including or excluding risk from the measurement.  
The results from the standard and risk-adjusted FISIM analysis highlight these issues 
very clearly. First, the wide difference in FISIM output between the risk-free and 
risk-reflected calculations shows the relationship between FISIM output and the 
reference rate used. The problem is that there is no universal agreement on a reference 
rate to use. The SNA guideline merely states that the reference rate should equal a 
“risk-free rate” of borrowing. However, due to the variety and complexity of markets in 
which commercial banks deal, the argument for using a risk-free rate is losing ground. 
 A second issue brought out is the problem of using a single reference rate as 
opposed to several reflecting the maturity of the loans and or deposits. Commercial 
banks have many categories of loans, each with different maturities and risk profiles. 
Applying one reference rate to the whole basket of loans is less than accurate and sure 
to give false outcomes, as previously discussed. 
The difference among the four risk-adjusted methods also requires further 
examination. The Eichmann and Fixler/Zieschang approaches gave similar results; 
generally lower than risk-free FISIM except for a few years where it was higher. The 
Collangelo/Mink and Basu/Inklaar/Wang approaches also resembled each other; both 
resulting in a much lower FISIM output, than the risk-free FISIM.   
One possible explanation of the low FISIM result of the Colangelo/Mink and 
Basu/Inklaar/Wang approaches can be explained by their use of a market reference, as 
opposed to a banking one. The argument is that banks have a lower risk compared to 
capital markets; therefore if you apply a market reference rate to a bank loan, the risks 
will be drastically overestimated, (Fixler and Zieschang 2010, Ashcraft and Steindel 
2008).  
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5.2 Answering hypothesis 2 
Hypothesis 2: The high ROE of the U.S commercial banking sector reported in the 
years 1994 to 2003 was mainly due to an increase in the assumption of risk in the 
form of financial leverage. 
This hypothesis was not verified because the link between increasing financial leverage 
and increasing ROE was not shown in the results.  The presence of high financial 
leverage of 14.03 corresponds to the one of the lowest total ROE reported of 1.33. This 
result could be due to the fact that after the crisis, the top of the equation (pre-tax net 
operating profit - applicable income taxes) decreased sharply, while the bottom of the 
equation (equity capital) remained stable, thus pushing the ROE to near negative 
territory in 2008 and negative in 2009. At the same time financial leverage was stable 
and even increasing slightly, because the top of the equation (total assets) decreased 
slightly following the crisis, while the bottom of the equation (tier 1 capital) increased 
slightly.  The results showed while the financial leverage was high, there was no direct 
link between fluctuations in financial leverage and ROE however, it is possible that 
analyzing data for a longer time period could give a better result. 
 
5.3 Answering hypothesis 3 
Hypothesis 3: The increase in tail-end risk exposure, as represented by financial 
innovations of derivatives, in combination with increased competition in the banking 
sector, contributed to increased to financial instability and the recent sub-prime 
financial crisis. 
This hypothesis was largely proved, but full confirmation remains to be achieved.  
While the growth in derivatives correspond increase in competition, there may be other 
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factor involved. What is more important is applying the two factors to the framework of 
Davis. Davis argued that a new innovation paired with increase in the competition has 
repeatedly preceded financial crisis. In this light, we can see derivatives as the financial 
innovation and combined with the increase in bank charters and thus competition 
among banks, the use of derivatives became a growing tool to increase returns while 
expanding tail-end risk. The two factors fit perfectly within the framework of Davis in 
explaining the role of derivatives and competition in increasing financial instability 
preceding the sub-prime crisis.   
 
5.4 Other findings 
A potentially important incidental finding, one I had not anticipated, is the link between 
the findings of hypothesis 1 and 3.  For the years of 1999 and 2004 there was an 
interesting result of all four risk-reflected FISIM techniques showed a reduction, while 
the next year, 2000 and 2005 respectively, the risk-reflected FISIM all increased, while 
the risk-free FISIM dropped dramatically.  Initially I assumed this was just a time lag, 
or that the risk-free rate was somehow following the risk-adjusted. However, another 
explanation is the link between increased competition and the use of financial 
innovation as show in hypothesis 3. 
 When competition increases, banks have to compete more aggressively for 
deposits, which reduces the spread between deposit and loan rates (Davis 1995, p. 219).  
Even if risk is increasing in the economy, as can be witnessed by the increase in 
derivatives and securitization, banks are not increasing the risk premiums, they in fact 
were reducing them, as shown in a drop in the risk-reflected FISIM. A possible reason 
for this is the increase in competition as argued by Davis.  The implication of this for 
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the FISIM output is that competition in the banking sector may lead to an 
underestimation of the risk premium needed to cover risk, as seen when risk-reflected 
FISIM drops and risk-free FISIM does not.  While this was argued by Davis, and thus 
is not a new idea, what is new is that FISIM may be able to serve as a warning or 
notification when banks are under pricing risk. While this is not the intention of the 
SNA in creating FISIM, it could be develop further into a kind of early warning 
measurement for the banking sector, to show when they are engaging in risk behavior 
which contributes to financial instability and possible financial crisis. 
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Chapter Six 
Summary and Conclusions 
 
 
This chapter will provide a brief summary, highlighting the main points and findings, as 
well as explain how the findings address the research objectives and questions.  
Following this I will provide the limitations of this research and the areas of further 
where further study is needed. 
 
6.1 Summary 
In this thesis I argued that while the financial sector has undergone major growth in the 
last 50 years, that at least recently this growth has been built on an increasing 
assumption of risk. In order to proved my argument I looked at the problems associated 
with FISIM, ROE and the increase of tail-end risk assumption in the U.S. commercial 
banking sector.   
 I first examine the problems associated with measuring the implicitly charged 
services through FISIM. I found that adjusting loan-side FISIM to reflect risk led to a 
reduction, and that the choice of reference rate largely affects the outcome of the 
calculation of FISIM. Correspondingly, due to the lack of definition by regulators as to a 
proper reference rate, FISIM thus does not reflect a clear situation of finance in the 
economy.   
 I next show that by breaking down the ROE of the U.S. commercial banking 
sector it can be seen that financial leverage may be responsible for the historically high 
ROE. However this result cannot be completely verified due to the short nature of the 
study I conducted, so further research is needed to confirm this assumption. 
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 Following this I examined the increase in both tail-end risk exposures as 
represented by derivatives, and the increase in competition among banks. I measured the 
derivatives reported on bank balance sheets and the new charters issued in the 
commercial banking sector, two factors which Davis (1995) shows to be contributors to 
financial fragility.  Thus the combination of these two factors may have contributed to 
the sub-prime crisis. 
 Finally, I found that it might be possible to use a risk-reflected FISIM as a 
signal to warn when banks are engaging in risky behavior, by not estimating the proper 
risk premium to cover risks should they materialize.  The implications of this last 
finding, while still preliminary in nature and requiring much work to uncover its 
plausibility, could prove to be a tool for monitoring banks risk pricing abilities. 
 
6.2 Conclusion 
To provide a conclusion I will review my research objectives and question and show 
how my research addressed each of this areas. 
The objectives of my research were: 
1) To gain a deeper understanding of how FISIM functions to measure implicit services 
of the financial sector, and secondly to show how risk affects the calculation of 
FISIM with the case of the U.S. commercial banking sector. I hope to add to this 
body of research with my analysis of the loan-side FISIM of the U.S. commercial 
banking sector. 
2) To examine the ROE of the U.S. commercial banking sector leading up to the 
sub-prime crisis, to discover what factors were responsible for the increasingly high 
ROE  
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3) To look at the increase of Tail-end risk in the U.S. commercial banking sector, and 
analyze its impact of financial fragility. 
These objectives were all met thought the research provided in the literature review and 
the analyses conducted. 
 I showed with my analysis of the standard and risk-reflected FISIM the 
relationship between reference rate and FISIM output.  I also showed how then 
banking sector sometimes underestimates the required risk premium, as evidenced by 
the times when risk-reflected FISIM is higher than risk-free FISIM. I also showed by 
breaking down the ROE of the U.S. commercial banking sector that while having a high 
amount of financial leverage, it cannot be confirmed that the ROE is solely built upon 
this factor alone. Further research is needed here to confirm this hypothesis.  Finally 
by applying the framework of Davis I made an argument for the combined roles of 
derivatives and competition in increasing financial instability and contributing to the 
sub-prime crisis. The excessive use of financial innovations by new entrants or low 
skilled banks is a possible factor in increasing the financial fragility. 
 
My research questions are as follows: 
1) Are the implicit services provided by the commercial banking sector properly 
reflected by the standard calculation of FISIM? 
 a) What is the impact of risk, in particular term premium and default risk, in the 
 FISIM measurement? 
2) What factors have the biggest influence in raising the ROE of the U.S. commercial 
banking sector? 
3) What is the role of the growth in tail-end risk exposure, as represented by derivatives, 
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in contributing to financial instability and the sub-prime crisis? 
 In answering question 1, I showed how the various risk-reflected FISIM 
methods all serve to adjust FISIM to reflect the element of risk. I concluded than term 
premium and default risk generally act to increase FISIM.  However this is not 
necessarily an overstatement of FISIM as Haldane, Brennan and Madouros claim 
because if banks increase the risk premium to cover increasing risks in the sector, this 
will mechanically boost FISIM. 
 To answer question 2, I broke down the ROE of the U.S. commercial banking 
sector into separate components, showing that financial leverage while high is not in 
isolation responsible for the high ROE. 
 To answer question 3, I analyzed both the growth in derivatives and 
competition among U.S. commercial banks, and then applied the framework of Davis 
(1995) to show how these factors can contribute to financial fragility, and thus could 
have contributed to the sub-prime crisis. 
 
6.3 Limitations 
The limitations of this research are include; first, each analysis used aggregate data for 
the entire U.S. commercial banking sector, as opposed to analyzing the data for 
individual banks. Aggregate data has the advantage of being easily available, but the 
disadvantage of being a simplified picture, or merely an average of the banking sector. 
A different approach could have been to take a sample of banks and looking at their 
individual balance sheet and income statement data.  
 A second limitation is that I used many previously designed models, which 
each have some assumption and limitations of their own, however, I attempted to limit 
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these as much as possible in adapting the models to fit my analysis. Included in this are 
two of the risk-reflected FISIM methods I used, which were developed to measure 
European FISIM and thus required converting the variables to fit the U.S. case. 
 A fourth limitation is the equation used to breakdown the ROE of commercial 
banks.  This equation assumes that the risks of the risk-weighted assets are correctly 
accounted for, but it has been argued that risk-weighted assets may not perfectly capture 
relative credit risks (Davis, 1995 p. 105).  
 A fifth limitation is in showing the link between derivatives and competition on 
financial fragility.  While these two factors fit with in Davis’s framework, there are 
many other factors coexisting simultaneously, which also may create financial 
instability. Therefore it is difficult to isolate specific factors that are solely responsible 
of financial crisis. 
 
6.4 Areas of further research 
There is still much research, which needs to be done in relation to the calculation of 
FISIM.  While this paper has focused on the practical measurement techniques and 
applied them to the U.S. commercial banking sector, thus progressing the discussion a 
bit further, more research is needed on the conceptual framework of FISIM.  I have 
just scratched the surface of some of these issues. 
 Another area of potential importance is the possibility of using risk-reflected 
FISIM as a warning when banks are not pricing risk correctly.  As evidenced by the 
years when risk-reflected FISIM dropped in relation to risk-free FISIM, banks may not 
be increasing the risk premiums to a level able to cover the risks should they materialize.  
However, much more research is needed if this incidental result is to be confirmed. 
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